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TRIBAL CANNABIS: SOLUTION TO OKLAHOMA PUBLIC 





Oklahoma public education, along with the educational systems in every 
state, experienced a huge cut in funding after the recession of 2008.
1
 While 
many states rebounded after the recession, Oklahoma continues to cut 
funding, resulting in one of the lowest average per pupil budgets in the 
country.
2
 This Comment proposes a progressive solution to Oklahoma’s 
shortage in public education funding, which consists of anticipating the 
inevitable legalization of cannabis in the State of Oklahoma and 
monopolizing on state-tribal relationships beforehand.
3
 While focusing on 
tribes’ unique sovereign and exemption status in respect to state taxation 
and regulation, Oklahoma has in the past successfully orchestrated 
agreements with tribes for gaming.
4
 Today, Oklahoma has a unique 
opportunity to model marijuana compacts after the state’s successful 
gaming compacts in order to create a new revenue stream that bridges the 
gap in educational funding. By signing compacts and effectively creating 
quasi-state law to legalize cannabis in Indian Country, Oklahoma would 
benefit from a percentage of tribal cannabis sales, much like its current 
receipt of tribal gaming fees. If, however, Oklahoma waits until cannabis 
legalization in the state, it will forfeit this advantageous position. Once 
                                                                                                             
 * Third year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. This piece was written 
and selected for publication prior to Oklahoma becoming the thirty-first state in the United 
States to legalize medical marijuana, on June 26, 2018. 
 1. Gene Perry, Oklahoma Continues to Lead U.S. for Deepest Cuts to Education, 
OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 16, 2014), https://okpolicy.org/oklahoma-continues-lead-u-s-
deepest-cuts-education/. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Melinda Smith, Comment, Native Americans and the Legalization of Marijuana: 
Can the Tribes Turn Another Addiction into Affluence?, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 507, 519 
(2014-2015); Lauren Adornetto, Comment, Indian Country Complexities and the Ambiguous 
State of Marijuana Policy in the United States, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (2017). The 
background for this Comment has been based upon the historical summaries provided by 
these earlier articles. 
 4. OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, 2016 ANNUAL IMPACT: STATEWIDE ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS FROM OKLAHOMA TRIBAL GOVERNMENT GAMING 8 (2016), https://oiga.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/OIGA-Impact-Report-2016.pdf; see Model Tribal Gaming 
Compact, 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 (2011 & Supp. 2013).  
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Oklahoma legalizes cannabis, tribes who grow on tribal lands will be 
exempt from paying taxes on any revenue generated under the umbrella 
protections of tribal sovereignty. There are many obstacles standing 
between Oklahoma tribes and tribal cannabis, but none of these obstacles 
are insurmountable, especially when tribal cannabis serves as a potential 
solution to Oklahoma’s underfunded public education issues. Lawmakers 
could find immense motivation to back a responsible and highly regulated 
tribal cannabis program if it meant funding for public education in 
Oklahoma and giving Oklahoma children an education they deserve.  
I. The Problem 
A state’s power over school finance is derived from the education clause 
in each state’s constitution, which establishes the legal standard for the 
quality of public education in that state and, as a minimum, mandates that 
public schools be free.
5
 States’ sole authority over education traces back to 
federalism and separation of powers. However, even though states are 
responsible for implementing their own budgets, certain public-school 
systems previously have sought legal action, in both state and federal 
courts, disputing budget allocations.
6
 The main claim in these lawsuits is 
that state legislators responsible for public school funding have “failed to 
fulfill [their] constitutional obligation to provide for adequate education” as 
enumerated in the education clause of that state’s constitution.
7
  
A. State of Public Education in Oklahoma 
Last summer, the Oklahoma City Public Schools district announced its 
intention to sue the state of Oklahoma for educational underfunding after 
the release of the 2017 state fiscal budget cuts.
8
 Public school officials 
unanimously voted in a board meeting to pursue legal action against the 
Oklahoma Legislature for ignoring its “‘constitutional responsibility’ to 
                                                                                                             
 5. The State Role in Education Finance, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug 20, 
2018, 7:05 AM), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/state-role-in-education-finance. 
aspx. 
 6. John Dayton, Serrano and Its Progeny: An Analysis of 30 Years of School Funding 
Litigation, 157 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 447, 448-49 (2001). 
 7. See William F. Dietz, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform 
Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193, 1194 (1996).  
 8. Associated Press, Oklahoma City Public Schools to Sue State Legislature, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP.: BEST STATES (Aug. 22, 2017, 6:15 PM), https://www.usnews.com/ 
news/best-states/oklahoma/articles/2017-08-22/oklahoma-city-public-schools-to-sue-state-
legislature [hereinafter Oklahoma City Public Schools to Sue].  
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provide textbooks for every child by eliminating funding for instructional 
materials.”
9
 The district claims that, due to budget cuts, schools are unable 
to make ends meet, important programs are being cut, and the standard of 
public education in Oklahoma public schools is suffering.
10
  
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
11
 Oklahoma pays its 
teachers less than any other state with an average salary of $42,460, as 
compared to neighboring states such as Texas, whose median salary is 
$55,500.
12
 The many teachers leaving Oklahoma to pursue teaching 
opportunities and increased salaries in neighboring states has left Oklahoma 
with an ever-increasing teacher shortage.
13
 Shawn Hime, the Executive 
Director of the Oklahoma State School Boards Association, described 
Oklahoma’s “hemorrhaging” of teachers to neighboring states as a shining 
example of “what it looks like when a state fails its schools and its 
children.”
14
 When states have a shortage of qualified teaching applicants, its 
schools grow “increasingly reliant on filling vacancies with teachers who 
have not yet completed the state’s requirements for . . . certification.”
15
 This 
means that in states with major shortages, like Oklahoma, the state Board of 
Education committee is forced to approve “emergency teaching 
certifications” to fill the vacancies.
16
  
Unfortunately, Oklahoma’s public education funding issues continue to 
worsen. After the 2008 recession, many states cut education budgets and as 
a result, lawmakers temporarily suspended their states’ standards for class 
sizes and up-to-date textbooks.
17
 Since 2008, Oklahoma legislators “have 
repeatedly voted to suspend the [educational] standards because schools 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. 
 10. See generally id.  
 11. High School Teachers: Pay, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ooh/ 
education-training-and-library/high-school-teachers.htm#tab-5 (last modified May 4, 2018). 
 12. Abigail Hess, The 5 Highest and Lowest Paying States for Teachers in the US, 
CNBC: MAKE IT (July 14, 2017, 4:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/14/the-5-highest-
and-lowest-paying-states-for-teachers-in-the-us.html.  
 13. Oklahoma Schools Struggle with Teacher Shortage Despite Cutbacks, Survey 
Shows, OKLA. ST. SCH. BOARDS ASS’N, http://www.ossba.org/2016/08/22/oklahoma-schools-
struggle-with-teacher-shortage-despite-cutbacks (last visited Apr. 2, 2018) [hereinafter 
Oklahoma Schools Struggle].  
 14. Id. (alteration in original). 
 15. Andrea Eger, Teacher Shortage: Oklahoma Hits Record for Emergency 
Certifications After Just 3 Months, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.tulsaworld. 
com/news/education/teacher-shortage-oklahoma-hits-record-for-emergency-certifications-
after-just/article_63d0250f-1530-56d6-937e-d45ef4410eb5.html.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Perry, supra note 1. 
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still can’t afford to meet them.”
18
 This downward trend is evidenced by the 
fact that the Oklahoma State Board of Education, which issued only 32 
emergency teaching certificates for 2011-12, had already issued 1429 by 
August of 2017 for the 2017-18 academic year.
19
 The approval of 
emergency teaching certifications to untrained applicants is in direct 
response to the State’s widespread teaching shortage.
20
 In yet another 
compromise to the State’s teaching standards, Oklahoma legislators passed 
a law last year extending the length of emergency certifications from one 
year to two years in an effort to bridge the ever-increasing gap.
21
 
 Surprisingly, even with this exorbitant increase in emergency 
certifications, Oklahoma still had over 800 teaching vacancies throughout 
its public education system for the 2016-17 year.
22
 To make matters worse, 
these vacancies did not include the number of teaching positions eliminated 
altogether by districts who cited budget cuts as the “primary factor” in their 
decisions.
23
 According to surveys conducted by the Oklahoma State School 
Boards Association, in which 83% of Oklahoma school districts 
participated in 2015 and 2016, and 74% participated in 2017, school 
officials admitted to eliminating 589 teaching positions in 2015,
24
 1530 in 
2016,
25
 and another 480 in 2017.
26
 With 3399 losses in the last three years, 
Oklahoma truly seems to be “hemorrhaging” teachers to neighboring states 
offering higher pay and better benefits.
27
 
The main concern with education underfunding is that by hiring 
untrained teachers or increasing class sizes to help mitigate the number of 
teaching vacancies, the quality of an Oklahoma child’s education decreases. 
Speaking on her growing concern for children being taught by these 
unproven teachers, State Superintendent Joy Hofmeister said that most 
emergency-certified teachers “walk[] in the door without the training or 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id.  
 19. Eger, supra note 15. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Oklahoma Schools Struggle, supra note 13.  
 24. OKLA. STATE SCH. BDS. ASS’N, 2016 OSSBA TEACHER SHORTAGE SURVEY (n.d.), 
https://www.ossba.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-OSSBA-Teacher-Shortage-
Report.pdf. 
 25. Oklahoma Schools Struggle, supra note 13. 
 26. Oklahoma’s Teacher Shortage Deepens, OKLA. ST. SCH. BOARDS ASS’N, 
https://www.ossba.org/2017/08/22/oklahomas-teacher-shortage-deepens/ (last visited Apr. 2, 
2018).  
 27. Oklahoma Schools Struggle, supra note 13. 
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experience to be able to meet the needs of students,” showing that the lack 




The effects of low educational expenditures directly correlate to the 
average scores on state standardized tests. According to an annual Quality 
Counts report released by Education Week, “[j]ust 2.7% of eighth graders 
achieve[d] advanced scores in math,” ranking Oklahoma students’ scores as 
“nearly the worst standardized test performance of all states.”
29
 The report, 
which assessed metrics such as “school finances, student achievement, and 
environmental factors” to “determine the strength of [the] school system,” 
ranked Oklahoma forty-sixth out of the fifty states studied.
30
 Oklahoma has 
one of the lowest-performing public education systems in the country, 
which comes as no surprise considering that for the 2017 fiscal year, 
“public education received $43.1 million less than the Legislature 
appropriated” due to inadequate revenue collections.
31
 Ultimately, 
something must change for Oklahoma to rebound its budget and make 
public education a priority again.  
B. Financial Status of Oklahoma Tribes 
Native American poverty is a national issue. While Oklahoma tribes, 
such as the Cherokee Nation, are generally more prosperous than other 
American tribes, they still often fall below the state’s median annual 
household income.
32
 Through the high success of state gaming compacts, 
Oklahoma tribes have proven their resourcefulness and ability to manage 
large gaming and hospitality operations.
33
 Gaming has afforded 
Oklahoma’s tribes the ability to provide better jobs and to attract tourists to 
various parts of Oklahoma’s rural Indian Country.
34
 This economic influx 
                                                                                                             
 28. Eger, supra note 15. 
 29. The States with the Best (and Worst) Schools, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/states-with-the-best-and-worst-schools_us_588a38db 
e4b0628ad613dee1.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.; Eger, supra note 15. 
 32. Gaby Galvin, Tribal Housing Reveals Inequalities in Indian Country, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP.: BEST STATES (Sept. 23, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/articles/2017-09-23/across-the-us-disparities-in-indian-country-emerge-through-tribal-
housing. 
 33. See Randy Ellis, Oklahoma Indian Gaming Revenues Soar (Aug. 15, 2010), 
NEWSOK, https://newsok.com/article/3485404/oklahoma-indian-gaming-revenues-soar.  
 34. See id. 
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has resulted in the excess gaming funds being used to finance tribal 
education, health, and social services programs.
35
 
Oklahoma tribes stand in stark contrast from other tribes that still rely 
heavily on the federal government to fund reservation activities. In 1996, 
the federal government passed the Native American Housing Assistance 
and Self-Determination Act (“NAHASDA”), which allocates housing aid 
distribution to tribes through block grants and loan guarantees.
36
 Congress 
recognized the correlation between deficient housing on tribal lands and 
poverty levels and enacted the NAHASDA to help tribal governments use 
federal funds to pull themselves out of poverty. In 2015, the Cherokee 
Nation of Oklahoma received $28.5 million from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development and used these funds to build 277 homes 
for tribal members.
37
 This successful utilization of federal funds becomes 
obvious when juxtaposed with the Navajo Nation, which received nearly 
three times the funds and only built approximately one-third of the houses 
the Cherokee built.
38
 These figures, acquired through an investigation by 
Senator John McCain's office and the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs,
39
 show that Oklahoma tribes are excellent at allocating funds 
towards the specific goal of self-sufficiency.  
It is Oklahoma tribes’ resourcefulness and ability to be self-sufficient 
that show their capability of responsibly legalizing tribal cannabis by 
working with state officials in a non-legal state. A new, monopolized 
revenue stream from cannabis could be the ultimate solution to ending 
tribal poverty in Oklahoma. Tribes in Oklahoma have already exhibited 
success in business and in working hand-in-hand with state regulators to 
form gaming compacts. Therefore, if tribes can replicate the agreements 
used for gaming, which is also still illegal in the State of Oklahoma, state-
tribal cannabis compacts are conceivable.  
  
                                                                                                             
 35. See id. 
 36. See Pub. L. No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4016 (1996) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-
4212 (2012)). 
 37. OFFICE OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, INVESTIGATION OF MISMANAGEMENT OF 
FEDERAL HOUSING FUNDING BY THE NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY 4 (2017), https://www. 
mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d43099a1-d0e9-4f51-95ef-367bcb7de1bd/investiga 
tion-of-mismanagement-of-federal-housing-funding-by-the-navajo-housing-authority.pdf. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See id.  
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II. The Obstacles 
Underfunding in Oklahoma’s public education system could be solved 
by the legalization of tribal cannabis, as tribes would be motivated to 
cooperate if it also meant a permanent solution to tribal poverty. However, 
there are many obstacles around which the parties would have to maneuver 
in order for such a proposition to become reality. This Section seeks to 
outline the potential roadblocks for the legalization of tribal cannabis in 
Oklahoma. Section III then explores how the proposed solution will 
successfully surmount the obstacles explained herein.  
A. Jurisdiction 
The most complex aspect of legalizing tribal cannabis is the 
jurisdictional overlaps that arise between the respective state, federal, and 
tribal governments. The federal government historically views American 
Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” meaning that their 
independence is not completely free of federal governance.
40
 Rather, their 
relationship with the United States more closely “resembles that of a ward 
to [its] guardian.”
41
 In support of this notion, the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Worcester v. Georgia found that the federal government 
has sole authority over “Indian country,” indicating that states have no 
jurisdiction over tribes or tribal members on tribal land because that power 
is exclusively reserved for the federal government.
42
 Indian Country is 
defined as all “land within the limits of any Indian reservation,” “all 
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States,” and 
“all Indian allotments” whose titles “have not been extinguished.”
43
 
Another well-established maxim speaking to the exclusivity of federal 
control over Indian affairs is Congress’s plenary power over tribes. 
44
 This 
means that “state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations 
[where] Congress has expressly . . . provided” in federal law.
45
 The 
traditional idea is that states, whose power parallels that of tribes, cannot 
enforce state laws upon tribal lands. However, Congress changed this 
                                                                                                             
 40. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 518 (1832). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 
(1903). 
 45. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
398 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
notion with the enactment of section 7 of Public Law 280 (“PL 280”).
46
 
Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162, PL 280 effectively transfers jurisdiction of 
law enforcement in Indian Country from the federal government to the 
states.
47
 PL 280 renders tribes and tribal lands subject to state jurisdiction 
via the express “federal consent” of Congress.
48
  
When PL 280 was initially enacted, it was applied in a mandatory 
fashion to the following six states: California; Minnesota (except the Red 
Lake Reservation); Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs 
Reservation); Wisconsin; and upon its statehood, Alaska.
49
 Within these 
mandatory states, however, some tribes proved the existence of their own 
“satisfactory law enforcement mechanisms,” which exempted them from 
PL 280’s application.
50
 Since the primary congressional goal behind PL 280 
was to ensure adequate policing on tribal lands, these tribes proved the 
capability of their own tribal police.
51
  
Subsequently, Congress amended the bill to include the option for states 
to relinquish jurisdiction back to the federal government.
52
 Additionally, 
any non-PL 280 state that seeks to have PL 280 apply must receive consent 
of the tribes before assuming jurisdiction.
53
 These amendments have 
resulted in many states converting to PL 280 areas by assuming at least 
some jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribal members on tribal land.
54
 
States added after the initial mandatory six include: Nevada, South Dakota, 
Washington, Florida, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Arizona, Iowa, and 
Utah.
55
 Note though, “not a single Indian Nation has consented” to being 
jurisdictionally subject to PL 280 since the amendment mandating tribal 
consent, evidencing a strong disfavor of state authority over Indian 
                                                                                                             
 46. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, and 28 U.S.C. § 1360). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 
877, 879 (1986). 
 49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012). These states are often 
referred to as “mandatory Public Law 280” jurisdictions because the majority of jurisdiction 
has been transferred from federal to state governments without consent of either the tribes or 
the states. 
 50. Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns for 
Victims of Crime in Indian Country, AM. INDIAN DEV. ASSOCIATES, LLC, http://www. 
aidainc.net/publications/pl280.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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 For tribes situated within PL 280 states, the state has concurrent 
criminal jurisdiction with tribal police over Indian reservations.
57
  
As for states that PL 280 does not apply to, including Oklahoma, it is the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) police who respond to most major crimes 
committed on reservations.
58
 In the case of any crime listed in the Major 
Crimes Act (“MCA”), which focuses on serious crimes such as kidnapping 
or murder, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) also assumes 
jurisdiction.
59
 The jurisdictional complexities intersect and overlap, with 
federal law outranking the tribes’ and states’ retained powers. Tribes cannot 
enact tribal laws that violate the federal government’s laws because federal 
law is “the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.”
60
 The dependency of tribes’ 
sovereign status comes from the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which states that in the case of a conflict between federal, 
state, or tribal law, federal law reigns supreme.
61
 The Supremacy Clause 
gives the federal government a power that is absolute in respect to conflicts 
between laws of tribes, states, and the federal government, with an example 
being laws over cannabis.
62
 
Tribal sovereignty refers to the inherent authority of Native American 
tribes to govern themselves within the borders of the United States because 
they possess aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute.
63
 
Because of the complex framework, this definition does not illuminate 
exactly what benefits tribal sovereignty affords tribes. Tribal sovereign 
interests include the ability to exercise “inherent sovereignty” over tribal 
members and even non-tribal members within tribal territory.
64
 This 
sovereignty means that tribal governments dictate both the laws and who 
they apply to in Indian Country with their “powers of self-government,” but 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-185); OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S TRIBAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT OF 2010, at 1, 4 (Dec. 
2017), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1801.pdf. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5129 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-185). Title 25 
U.S.C.A. chapter 45 details the protection of Indians and the conservation of tribal land 
resources, illustrating that these rights have not been withdrawn and have instead been 
codified as a form of further protection. 
 64. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981). 
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this is limited to only what is “necessary to protect tribal self-
government.”
65
 Two of the benefits tribes receive from sovereign status 
include their exemption status from taxes, in regards to both state and 
federal taxes on revenue generated by the tribe on tribal lands, and their 
immunity from lawsuits.
66
 Both of these benefits have immense 
implications in the cannabis realm because not only are the proceeds from 
tribal cannabis sales non-taxable, but the tribes are also immune from 
lawsuits.
67
 Additionally, federal courts have held that tribal immunity 
extends beyond the tribe itself to “tribal enterprises,” such as casinos or 
theoretically cannabis grows, should courts determine that the grows are an 
“arm of [the nation].”
68
 In order to qualify as an “arm” of a tribe, the 
purpose of the business in question cannot merely be to generate money.
69
 
Instead, the respective business has to further a tribe’s “governmental 
objectives” of “health and welfare” of its members.
70
 
B. Federal Marijuana Policy 
Historically, the possession, cultivation, distribution, and sale of 
marijuana has been illegal everywhere in the United States, including 
Indian Country, due to the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).
71
 Under the 
CSA, which outlines the federal government’s drug policy, marijuana 
remains a Schedule 1 substance.
72
 The federal government classifies 
Schedule 1 substances, like cannabis, as having a “high potential for abuse” 
and “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.”
73
 
Despite its Schedule 1 status, many states have sought and successfully 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. at 564.  
 66. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/rr67_284.pdf; 
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 
 67. Freemanville Water Sys., Inc. v. Poarch Bank of Creek Indians, 563 F.3d 1205, 
1207-08 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that tribes, as governments, enjoy immunity from 
lawsuits much like the federal government, states, and foreign powers). 
 68. Inyo Cty. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 
U.S. 701, 705 n.1 (2003); see Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 523 U.S. at 757-58. 
 69. See Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 992 
(N.Y. 1995). 
 70. See id. 
 71. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-971 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-185); Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Drug Enf't Admin., 190 F. Supp. 3d 843, 849, 854 (E.D. Wis. 
2016).  
 72. 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(1); see U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2017 NATIONAL DRUG 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 100 n. 34 (Oct. 2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
07/DIR-040-17_2017-NDTA.pdf. 
 73. 21 U.S.C.A § 812(b)(1). 
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States that have legalized marijuana were warned by the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) in a 2013 memorandum to adequately protect against what 
the federal government considers to be the eight most pressing threats of 
cannabis regulation.
75
 The eight threats include: 
$ Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;  
$ Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from 
going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;  
$ Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where 
it is legal under state law in some form to other states;  
$ Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from 
being used as a cover or pretext for trafficking of other 
illegal drugs or other illegal activity;  
$ Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana;  
$ Preventing drugged driving and exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with 
marijuana use;  
$ Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and 
the attendant public safety and environmental dangers 
posed by marijuana production on public lands and;  




Deputy Attorney General James Cole instructed federal prosecutors 
nationwide to focus their prosecutorial efforts and resources on these threats 
rather than singling out those within state compliance.
77
 Due to confusion 
                                                                                                             
 74. See generally 30 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.: Laws, Fees, and 
Possession Limits, PROCON.ORG, https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php? 
resourceID=000881 (last updated July 28, 2018).  
 75. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo] (“Guidance Regarding 
Marijuana Enforcement”), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/30520138291327568 
57467.pdf.  
 76. Id. at 1-2. 
 77. Id. 
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surrounding how the implications outlined in the Cole Memo applied to 
Indian Country, Monty Wilkinson, the Director of the DOJ, issued a 
subsequent memorandum on October 28, 2014, known as the “Wilkinson 
Memo,” addressing these issues.
78
 The Wilkinson Memo reiterated that the 
eight threats outlined in the Cole Memo should guide U.S. Attorneys in 
their prosecutorial efforts against cannabis in Indian Country.
79
 It is 
important to note that neither the Cole Memo nor the Wilkinson Memo 
forfeit the federal government’s inherent right to raid any cannabis 
operation throughout the country, including those on tribal lands.
80
 These 
memos merely indicate the willingness of the federal government to focus 
its efforts elsewhere.  
One practical implication of the Wilkinson Memo is that the federal 
government and its agents will treat tribal governments that decide to 
legalize marijuana the same as state governments and will respect their 
decision to legalize.
81
 So long as tribal regulations are strict enough to 
adequately protect against the Cole Memo threats, tribes and states should 
escape federal intrusion into their cannabis operations.
82
  
The main question that looms over the legalization of tribal cannabis in 
Oklahoma is whether the DOJ will work with Oklahoma tribes willing to 
adhere to the Cole Memo Guidelines despite their tribal cannabis plans 
conflicting with state laws. One answer could be that tribes whose 
reservations are located in states where cannabis remains illegal will be left 
to fend for themselves by attempting to obtain a DEA Registration 
(historically unlikely) or to pass state legislation/ballot initiatives. In the 
context of possible solutions, Oklahoma tribes have the best shot at 
legalizing cannabis and working with state government officials to enter 
into state compacts, therefore “adopt[ing] a mutually satisfactory regime for 
the collection of” a cannabis tax or exclusivity fee.
83
 
                                                                                                             
 78. Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Director, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All United 
States Attorneys et al. (Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Wilkinson Memo] (“Policy Statement 
Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country”), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
tribal/pages/attachments/2014/12/11/policystatementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountr
y2.pdf. 
 79. Id. at 2. 
 80. See id.; Cole Memo, supra note 75, at 4. 
 81. See Wilkinson Memo, supra note 78, at 2. 
 82. See id.; Cole Memo, supra note 75, at 2. 
 83. 25 U.S.C. § 5123(e) (2012); see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991) (finding states and tribes could 
reach mutual agreements for the collection of cigarette sales taxes). 
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C. State Opposition to Marijuana 
While Oklahoma does not have a PL 280 problem, the state, which has 
voted Republican in every election since 1968, likely holds a traditionally 
conservative stance against cannabis.
84
 However, the tides are turning in 
Oklahoma, which is evidenced by the fact that 2018 marks the first year in 
history that medical marijuana will appear on an Oklahoma ballot.
85
 State 
Question 788the Medical Marijuana Legalization Initiativegarnered 
enough votes to require its appearance on the state ballot in 2017, but there 
was some pushback from state officials.
86
 In fact, while enough votes were 
secured and certified in September of 2016, a vote on marijuana was 
noticeably absent on the ballot in 2017.
87
  
The reason for State Question 788’s absence from the ballot was the 
alleged rewording of the Question’s title by Oklahoma Attorney General 
Scott Pruitt, arguably making a vote for medical marijuana seem as though 
the vote was for recreational use.
88
 Pruitt’s rewrite stated that a vote “yes” 
would legalize the “licensed use, sale and growth of marijuana in 
Oklahoma,” changing the original title from “medical” to “licensed.”
89
 
Oklahomans for Health filed a lawsuit against Pruitt in the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma challenging the rewrite.
90
 Pruitt was later replaced as a 
defendant in the lawsuit by the current Oklahoma Attorney General Mike 
Hunter.
91
 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in favor of Oklahomans 
for Health on March 27, 2017, restoring State Question 788’s title to its 
original form.
92
 Most likely, State Question 788 will appear on 2018’s 
general election ballot. However, the Governor might require a special 
                                                                                                             
 84. See generally Oklahoma Election Results 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 
AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/oklahoma. 
 85. See generally Oklahoma State Question 788, Medical Marijuana Legalization 
Initiative (June 2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oklahoma_State_Question_ 
788,_Medical_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative_(June_2018) (last visited Oct. 27, 2017) 
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 86. See Steele v. Pruitt, 378 P.3d 47 (Okla. 2016).  
 87. Oklahoma State Question 788, supra note 85. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Petitioner's Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Combined Petition to 
Review the Ballot Title of Initiative Petition 412, at 4, Paul v. Hunter, 2017 OK 25, 393 P.3d 
202 (Okla. 2017) (No. 115322), http://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx? 
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lawsuit by the current Oklahoma Attorney General Mike Hunter. 
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 92. Id. 
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election for the initiative. This special election would require voters to show 
up on a completely separate day to cast their votes for the medical 




One of the main reasons state actors have fought against marijuana 
legislation reform is the fear of voter disapproval. However, according to 
SoonerPoll, “Oklahoma’s only independent, non-partisan pollster[,]”
94
 state 
support for medical marijuana legalization is a strong 62%.
95
 In addition, in 
2013 one survey showed that 81.6% of Oklahoman voters agreed that laws 
regulating marijuana should be decided by the state government rather than 
the federal government,
96
 echoing the position of the twenty-nine other 
states in the nation that have already legalized medical marijuana.
97
 In 
response to the polling data and echoing the sentiments of the majority of 
her constituents, Oklahoma State Senator Constance Johnson remarked that 
“the results make you wonder what these elected officials are afraid of.”
98
 
With voter disapproval no longer a key concern, Oklahoma governmental 
actors should be motivated to approve a solution to education funding that 
involves cannabis.  
State actors might be resistant towards cannabis for politically 
conservative reasons, but they have already evidenced a strong motivation 
to solve Oklahoma’s funding problem by somewhat liberal means. In fact, 
public education underfunding has concerned Oklahoma legislators for 
many years. This concern is evidenced by previous unsuccessful attempts to 
solve the state’s budget issues through various means, such as the 
Oklahoma One Percent Sales Tax initiative. The Oklahoma One Percent 
Sales Tax Bill, otherwise known as State Question 779, called for a liberal 
increase of the state sales tax by one percent and an allocation of all 
                                                                                                             
 93. See Oklahoma State Question 788, supra note 85. 
 94. History of SoonerPoll, SOONERPOLL.COM, https://soonerpoll.com/history/ (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
 95. Bill Shapard, Absent Any Funded Opposition, Medicinal Marijuana Headed for 
Passage, SOONERPOLL (Jan. 12, 2018), https://soonerpoll.com/absent-any-funded-
opposition-medical-marijuana-headed-for-passage. 
 96. Bill Shapard, Poll: Oklahoman Views of Marijuana Are Changing, SOONERPOLL 
(Sept. 23, 2013), https://soonerpoll.com/poll-oklahomans-views-of-marijuana-are-changing/ 
[hereinafter Shapard, 2013 SoonerPoll]. 
 97. 30 Legal Medical Marijuana States and D.C.: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, 
supra note 74.  
 98. Shapard, 2013 SoonerPoll, supra note 96.  
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revenue generated from the tax to go directly to public education funding.
99
 
Though the tax was estimated to bring in approximately $615 million per 
year, Oklahoma voters rejected the proposal in 2016.
100
 Nearly sixty percent 
of Oklahomans voted against State Question 779, indicating voters’ strong 
disapproval for the increase of the state sales tax as a solution to the state’s 
education funding issues.
101
 However, voter opposition related to increasing 
state sales tax does not correlate to the proposed solution of an Oklahoma 
tribal cannabis regime. While voters may be reluctant to increase general 
sales taxes, it seems unlikely that Oklahoma’s voters would reject a tax on 
cannabis sales. Tribes would be the ones paying the exclusivity fees for 
cannabis, so voters would have to find other grounds for disapproval of 
tribal cannabis.  
In sum, the two obstacles for state opposition include pushback from 
state legislators and rejection by Oklahoma’s voters. As for the first 
obstacle, Oklahoma legislators have already proven their willingness to 
solve the state’s budget issues by initiating the One Percent Sales Tax in 
2016. Though Oklahoma is a fiscally conservative state and most of its 
elected officials are Republicans, state officials still pushed for an increase 
in taxation. This shows that state actors take public education underfunding 
seriously and are willing to reach compromises to progress toward a long-
term solution. As for the second obstacle, voter polls and the certification of 
State Question 788 prove voters do not disapprove of legalization. 
Oklahoma voters are supportive of the idea of medical cannabis. Therefore, 
if the vote for tribal cannabis is premised on the idea that it would help 
public education, it may motivate voters enough to pass the resolution. If 
state legislators use the movement away from the state’s traditional anti-
cannabis stance to redirect from the idea of absolute legalization and 
instead focus on a more intermediate step, such as legalization restricted to 
tribal lands, tribal cannabis is possible.  
D. The Commerce Clause and Tribal Sovereignty 
Due to its inherent Commerce Clause implications, the third threat 
mentioned in the DOJ memos, which calls for protection against cannabis 
traveling from an area where it is legal into areas where it is not,
102
 is the 
                                                                                                             
 99. Oklahoma One Percent Sales Tax, State Question 779 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, 
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(last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. 
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most important issue with respect to the legalization of cannabis in Indian 
Country.
103
 Interstate commerce, or in this case, commerce between tribal 
and nontribal lands, puts the third Wilkinson threat within the federal 
government’s exclusive jurisdiction “to regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the 
several [s]tates, and . . . Indian [t]ribes.”
104
 Tribes do not want to trigger 
federal intrusion because cannabis remains wholly illegal under federal law.  
This threat has already had the greatest impact on governmental scrutiny 
for tribes who have employed cannabis operations on tribal lands.
105
 The 
fear of scrutiny is evidenced by the fact that most tribes who have started 
cannabis businesses have already set up strict regulatory schemes to prevent 
this sort of off-reservation transfer.
106
 The concern with off-reservation 
implications is that when tribes enact laws that go “beyond matters of 
internal self-governance” and extend to “off-reservation business 
transaction[s] with non-Indians, their claim of sovereignty is at its 
weakest.”
107
 The Cole Memo further clarifies that agents with the federal 
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) will not focus on state-regulated 
protocols and will instead work to prevent the above mentioned threats.
108
 
If states can provide sufficiently robust regulations that satisfy federal 
authorities, the federal government will cooperate with state officials to 
block efforts by those who violate the state guidelines.
109
  
In 2015, a federal circuit court solidified the “allowance” attitude of the 
federal government in regards to effective state cannabis protocols in 
United States v. Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana.
110
 The Marin court 
held that the Rohrabacher Amendment to a 2015 Appropriations Act 
prevented “the [DOJ] from expending any funds in connection with the 
enforcement of any law that interferes with [the state’s] ability to 
‘implement [its] own state law[]’” regarding cannabis.
111
 This decision was 
the first case to support the DOJ memos and the federal government’s 
                                                                                                             
 103. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 104. Id. 
 105. See Marijuana Compact Between the Suquamish Tribe and the State of Washington 
(Sept. 15, 2015), https://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/Compact-9-14-15.pdf 
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 108. Cole Memo, supra note 75, at 1. 
 109. See id. 
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desire to support effective state cannabis regulation. Marin stands for the 
contention that the federal government should respect state sovereignty 
instead of hindering it. The federal government’s efforts and resources are 
better utilized towards preventing and detecting criminal activity that is not 
in accordance with either state or federal law. The federal government’s 
attitude towards effective state regulation could be considered 
foreshadowing for how it might treat a tribe who is able to effectively 
regulate tribal cannabis operations. It must be noted, however, that 
subsequent decisions have treated Marin negatively, making it hard to 
know if this case provides a concrete rule barring federal prosecution of 
those in compliance with state regulatory schemes.
112
 
Another key issue to consider is tribal sovereignty and what that means 
for the existence of tribal cannabis in Oklahoma or any other state. While 
nothing in the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants tribes sovereign immunity, 
the Supreme Court has ruled that tribal powers are a “limited sovereignty 
[that have] never been extinguished.”
113
 Others argue that because tribes are 
mentioned in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution alongside two other 
types of government, their status as independent government entities is 
similar to the several states and foreign nations.
114
 Indian tribes are 
“domestic dependent nations” that exercise inherent sovereign authority 
over their members and territories.
115
 Lawsuits against Indian tribes “are 




Although a tribe's sovereign immunity bars Oklahoma from pursuing a 
lawsuit to enforce its rights, adequate alternatives may exist. Individual 
Indians employed in “smoke shops” may not enjoy the protection of tribal 
sovereign immunity, as evidenced by the ability of states to collect sales tax 
from cigarette wholesalers or to enter into mutually satisfactory agreements 
with tribes for the collection of taxes.
117
 However, the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                             
 112. See United States v. Chavez, No. 2:15-cr-210-KJN, 2016 WL 916324 (E.D. Cal. 
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“never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable for 
damages in actions brought by the State.”
118
  
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe 
of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court clarified the doctrine of Indian tribal 
sovereignty.
119
 The Court held that, under the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, 
a state that has not asserted jurisdiction over Indian lands pursuant to PL 
280 can collect sales taxes from sales made on Indian lands to nonmembers 
of the tribe.
120
 However, while the Court said that tribes are expected to tax 
sales to non-tribal members, the Court effectively reinforced tribal 
sovereignty by reiterating that tribes still enjoy immunity from suit.
121
 
Therefore, a state has the right to impose sales tax on Indian sales to 
nontribal members, but a state may not bring suit against a tribe to enforce 
that right.  
In the Potawatomi case, the court of appeals concluded that “Oklahoma 
did not elect to assert jurisdiction under PL 280,” and as such, “the 
Potawatomis were immune from any requirement of Oklahoma state tax 
law.”
122
 Though this lower court seemed to suggest that the power of states 
to tax came from PL 280, the Supreme Court clarified that while PL 280 
might subject a tribe to state taxation if it sold to non-tribal members, the 
state still has no right to enforce the taxation scheme due to the tribe’s 
sovereign immunity.
123
 The Court held that while sovereign immunity 
precluded the state from taxing sales of goods to tribal members, the state 
was “free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers.”
124
 Therefore, while 
Oklahoma may have a right to tax gaming or cannabis if sales to non-tribal 
members generate the revenue, the state still cannot sue the tribes for 
noncompliance. States essentially have a right without a remedy because 
the Supreme Court is unwilling to alter the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.  
The main reasons Congress enacted PL 280 was to limit illegal activity 
occurring on certain reservations while also supporting potentially 
inadequate tribal law enforcement.
125
 Congress was concerned that Indian 
tribes were not adequately organized to enforce law and order.
126
 Due to 
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state governments’ proximity and interest in crime prevention within their 
borders, Congress thought the problem “could best be remedied by 
conferring criminal jurisdiction” to the states.
127
 Importantly, however, 
while PL 280 transferred criminal jurisdiction to states, neither the 
Committee Reports, nor the floor discussions on PL 280, exhibited 
congressional intent to allow states to tax Indian sales.
128
 Therefore, 
Oklahoma’s status as a non-PL 280 state does not affect taxing Indian 
sales.
129
 In the context of tribal cannabis, if an Oklahoma tribe sold to non-
tribal members on Indian lands, the state government would have an 
interest in taxation for these sales but would lack an available remedy to 
collect these taxes based on the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. A state 
compact would be an equitable solution to this problem, giving Oklahoma 
motivation to agree to a state compact on these grounds.  
In sum, the inapplicability of PL 280 to Oklahoma tribes is beneficial 
rather than detrimental. Even if marijuana remains illegal under state law, 
due to the inapplicability of PL 280 to Oklahoma and the doctrine of tribal 
sovereignty, tribes can still enact their own laws without being subject to 
the Oklahoma criminal law regime.  
1. Oklahoma’s Exclusivity Fee Benefits Both State and Tribe  
By working together to form a state marijuana compact, the tribes will 
benefit from a monopoly on Oklahoma’s marijuana market while the state 
brings an end to the shortage of public education funding. In 2015, the 
Suquamish Tribe of Washington was the first tribe to successfully enter into 
a state marijuana compact for the growth, sale, and distribution of tribal 
cannabis while it remained illegal at the federal level.
130
 The first of its 
kind, the compact directly referenced both the Cole and Wilkinson memos 
and their focus on the need for “strict regulation and control over the 




While the compact notably recognizes the inability of the state to tax 
tribal businesses, including cannabis, it does mandate a “tribal tax” in its 
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 The tribal tax must be “at least 100 percent of the [s]tate [t]ax on 
all sales of marijuana products in Indian country.”
133
 Under normal 
circumstances, the state cannot tell tribes how to allocate their tribally-
generated funds, but under the compact, the tribe must specifically “agree[] 
to use the proceeds of the Tribal Tax for Essential Government Services.”
134
 
Importantly, while most states charge an exclusivity fee for gaming that is 
paid directly to the respective state governments, tribal cannabis is 
different. “Taxed” funds derived from tribal cannabis are allocated directly 
back into the tribe’s own pocket for the specific purpose of strengthening 
their ability to successfully run and regulate all tribal matters, including 
cannabis operations.  
To date, other marijuana compacts have followed Washington’s lead and 
required that the funds garnered from cannabis taxation be directed back 
into respective tribal governments.
135
 While tribes favorably view most 
states that direct cannabis exclusivity fees back to the tribes for the purpose 
of strengthening tribal self-governance, it is uncertain if that would be the 
case in Oklahoma. Would the State of Oklahoma look like the bad guys for 
taking the taxed percentage? Today, it is not likely that the State would be 
viewed negatively for taking such action. The key distinction between 
Oklahoma and every other state that has entered into state compacts, such 
as Nevada, California, Washington, and Oregon, is that cannabis remains 
illegal in Oklahoma. While state governments where cannabis is already 
legal have followed the trend of allowing the tribes to keep any taxed 
revenues from cannabis sales, Oklahoma’s situation is completely different. 
Oklahoma tribes will get to monopolize the cannabis market in the state; 
this includes income generated from residents of neighboring states like 
Texas, who already make up a large percentage of gambling patrons in 
Oklahoma. Tribes would still have the option to wait until full legalization 
if they wanted to avoid any sort of taxation or exclusivity fee payment. But, 
since the fee would be similar to what tribes already pay for gaming and 
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would provide a monopolized market, it would be advantageous for tribes 
to enter into the cannabis market prior to its legalization in Oklahoma. 
2. The Trump Administration’s Stance on Marijuana 
The Trump administration’s views on marijuana legalization are starkly 
different than those of the Obama administration. Since President Trump 
appointed Jeff Sessions as the Attorney General of the United States, he has 
repeatedly announced and directed local district attorneys and the DOJ to 
spearhead the fight against legal marijuana. In fact, Attorney General 
Sessions is so opposed to the legalization of marijuana that he joked at his 
1986 Senate confirmation hearing that pot was worse than racism.
136
 Even 
though Sessions has since referred to that comment as something he “do[es] 
not recall [saying],”
137
 it still represents an administrative stance on 
cannabis that is starkly different than that of the Obama administration, 
which issued both the Cole and Wilkinson memos.
138
  
Given the current political climate, one must wonder how Trump and 
Sessions might try to impede Oklahoma tribal cannabis in the future. 
However, this issue will not have a solution until the current administration 
reveals plans to move forward with combatting current cannabis regulation 
and legalization. As recently as November of 2017, Sessions testified 
before the House Judiciary Committee that both he and the Trump 
administration plan to continue the Obama-era policy of respecting state 
sovereignty and disallowing federal intrusion into state-legalized cannabis 
operations and grows.
139
 Sessions initially said that “‘[the Trump 
administration’s] policy is the same . . . as the Holder-Lynch policy, which 
is that the federal law remains in effect and a state can legalize marijuana 
for its law enforcement purposes but it still remains illegal with regard to 
federal purposes.’”
140
 However, Sessions backtracked this stance when he 
released a memo in January of 2018 directed towards U.S. Attorney’s 
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The practical effect of Sessions’ memo is that he placed the prosecutorial 
discretion directly back into the hands of each state’s U.S. Attorney’s 
office.
142
 While this might seem like a drastic change in stance, states like 
Colorado have already released statements indicating that their prosecution 
efforts will continue to focus on those breaking their state’s regulatory 
guidelines on marijuana rather than prosecuting individuals trying to abide 
by their respective state laws.
143
  
Though this particular area of cannabis law might change in the future, 
for now, states like Washington are leading by example of how to satisfy 
federal standards for tribal cannabis operations. Ultimately, their success 
comes from the fact that their agreements are the mutual production of state 
and tribal governments. State-tribal marijuana compacts seem to remain the 
best move forward, no matter the shifting pieces of prosecutorial guidelines.  
III. The Solution 
Oklahoma tribes should enter into state-tribal marijuana compacts that 
are modeled after Oklahoma’s current tribal gaming compacts. In order to 
motivate state actors, the compact should provide for a percentage of all 
sales of tribal cannabis to be paid to the state as an exclusivity fee that is 
similar to the fee paid for gaming. This will help to both smooth over 
conservative concerns about cannabis legalization while providing a 
solution to the problem of public education underfunding. Additionally, to 
ensure the financial benefits of tribal cannabis go directly to the public 
education system, the compact should include a clause similar to the one 
present in the tribal gaming agreement that requires funds to be allocated 
specifically to the state’s public education system. It is imperative to the 
overall acceptance of the tribal cannabis regime that the funds be directly 
allocated to Oklahoma’s education funding source. While tribal cannabis 
would have its own unique benefits for both tribal members and state 
citizens, the benefit it would provide to Oklahoma’s budget problem would 
ensure that tribal cannabis was a success for everyone involved.  
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A. A Previous Gamble That Paid Off: Indian Gaming Act of 1988 
In order to achieve similarly successful results, Oklahoma should model 
tribal cannabis after tribal gaming. In 2004, Oklahoma passed the 
Oklahoma State Tribal Gaming Act (“Gaming Compact”), a pre-approved 
gaming compact that allowed gaming on tribal lands despite the fact that 
gaming remains illegal in other areas of the state.
144
 According to the most 
current annual impact report by the Oklahoma Indian Gaming Association, 
the direct impact of tribal gaming on Oklahoma’s economy was $4.75 
billion in 2015.
145
 Tribal gaming also stimulates the economy in indirect 
ways by driving tourism and providing additional jobs through the 
construction of gaming facilities.
146
 These indirect sources of revenue 
brought in an additional $2.2 billion in 2015, bringing the total impact of 
tribal gaming on the State of Oklahoma to $7.2 billion since its creation.
147
  
Under the terms of the current Gaming Compact, Oklahoma tribes must 
pay the state a fee based on a percentage of the revenue earned from certain 
classes of games.
148
 Oklahoma State Treasurer Scott Meacham “said the 
percentage fee assessed by the [S]tate was determined by looking at what 
comparable states were receiving” at the time the compact was made.
149
 
According to Meacham, none of the thirty Oklahoma tribes who participate 
in gaming are subject to state taxation on their gaming revenues.
150
 In lieu 
of this tax, the state gaming compact provides for the annual fee to be an 
“exclusivity payment” owed to the state in varying percentages.
151
 The 
exclusivity payment has binary benefits: it encourages state officials to 
work with tribes to create and maintain gaming pacts while also benefitting 
tribes by giving them “a protected market for this economic activity.”
152
 In 
other words, Oklahoma tribes currently have a monopoly on the gaming 
industry in Oklahoma because the compact only legalized gambling on 
tribal lands.  
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While gaming has provided a substantial financial boost to the Oklahoma 
economy, equally important is the location where the money is generated. 
While most Oklahoma businesses are able to thrive more easily in densely-
populated cities like Oklahoma City and Tulsa, tribal gaming is thriving in 
rural markets. Gaming can only occur on tribal lands, which are mostly 
rural. Tribal gaming has greatly benefitted rural areas by generating the 
majority (64%) of its earnings impact.
153
 According to the 2016 U.S. 
Census, over 1.3 million Oklahoma residents live in rural areas.
154
 By 
creating and making jobs available to these rural residents, who make up a 
third of the state’s population, tribal gaming has helped lower the state’s 
unemployment rate.
155
 Since its inception thirteen years ago, the success of 
tribal gaming has led to increased job creation for Oklahomans. Currently, 
the direct effect of tribal gaming equates to 27,944 people being employed 
by the gaming industry.
156
 When that figure is added to the number of jobs 
indirectly provided by the gaming industry, the total impact of gaming on 
employment in Oklahoma amounts to 48,942 people.
157
 In total, Oklahoma 




Tribes have also used their current monopoly on gaming to secure a 
brighter future for tribal members. For many Oklahoma tribes, like the 
Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw,
159
 gaming has proven itself as a means 
to strengthen tribal self-governance by using gaming revenues to enhance 




Gaming revenues provide obvious benefits to the state’s economy and to 
rural Oklahomans, but other state programs also benefit because gaming 
funds have been allocated to them directly. While the exclusivity payments 
are divided between “education, mental health services and state agencies,” 
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the vast majority of the funds go towards public education.
161
 After setting 
aside $250,000 for the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Services, 88% of the remaining revenues go directly into 
the state’s education fund, known as the Education Reform Revolving Fund 
or 1017 fund.
162
 In total, Oklahoma tribes “have paid more than $1.123 
billion in exclusivity fees to the State” since 2006.
163
 As of 2015, Indian 
gaming had contributed over $1 billion to Oklahoma’s public education 
system.
164
 Clay Pope, a former member of the Oklahoma House of 
Representatives, described tribal gaming as “one of the best moves” the 
legislature has made thus far in terms of benefiting the economy.
165
  
With a huge portion of the state’s educational funding relying on these 
exclusivity payments, Oklahoma cannot afford to see decreases in the 
amount being paid by the tribes to the state. However in 2014, the state saw 
a $5.5 million decrease in payments from the 2013 fiscal year.
166
 The 
decline was thought to be the product of tribes diversifying casinos with 
non-Class III games, such as electronic slot machines, that are not subject to 
fees.
167
 Though the payments have made a rebound in the last two years, 
Class II games are growing at a faster rate than Class III games,
168
 making 
the future of gaming exclusivity payments somewhat undetermined. The 
gaming compact will be revisited in 2018, so the types of games charged or 
the percentage cut allocated to the state in payments may change, 
potentially affecting the future of tribal gaming’s contribution to public 
education in Oklahoma. 
As a solution to the unknown future of gaming payments, introducing a 
state marijuana compact could bridge the gap in educational funding while 
still remaining one step removed from full cannabis legalization. The 
success of tribal gaming indicates that modeling a tribal cannabis operation 
after the current gaming regulations in Oklahoma could prove beneficial to 
both tribes and the state. Though cannabis remains illegal at the federal 
level, tribes should be able to enjoy the development of a productive and 
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safe marijuana industry. Importantly, however, PL 280 provides one major 
restriction that could cause disparate treatment to state and tribal cannabis 
grows. While PL 280 puts tribes at the mercy of the laws of the states in 
which their reservation is located, Oklahoma fortunately is not a PL 280 
state. While this restriction could lead to complex issues for tribes like the 
Navajo, whose reservation sits in three states, Oklahoma tribes would have 
the advantage of being exempt from this particular complication. 
B. What Would an Oklahoma Marijuana State Compact Look Like?  
Since the issuance of the Wilkinson Memo, there has been disparate 
treatment of federal intrusion on tribal cannabis grows.
169
 Many tribes have 
been successful in cooperating with their respective state governments to 
form state compacts the federal government has, so far, respected.
170
 
Conversely, some other tribes have been subject to federal raids, the burning 
of their grow sites, and even arrests of their non-tribal consultants who are 
not shielded from prosecution under the umbrella of tribal sovereignty.
171
 
Due to PL 280, states and their inherent police powers have assumed criminal 
jurisdiction over tribal lands situated within PL 280 states.
172
 Therefore, if 
cannabis is legalized in a PL 280 state, subsequent tribal cannabis operations 
will be subject to the full extent of the state’s criminal laws, highlighting the 




In a move consistent with the federal government’s policy reasons for 
implementing PL 280, the federal government also seems to be transferring 
jurisdiction for tribal cannabis regulation to the states via the Wilkinson 
Memo.
174
 Because of this transfer of jurisdictional authority, it seems the only 
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way for tribes to avoid federal intrusion into reservation land containing 
cannabis grows is to enter into a compact with their respective state in which 
they agree on terms and regulations of said operation. As for Oklahoma 
tribes, the previous treatment of cannabis grows in other states serves as a 
warning. The main objective of state compacts is for tribal governments to 
work hand-in-hand with the attorneys general in their respective jurisdictions 
to come to a contracted agreement that aligns the tribal operations with state 
regulations.
175
 If Oklahoma tribes can find common ground with government 
officials, it would be possible to legalize cannabis on reservation lands by 
entering into a state compact.  
Signing this sort of compact would mean that the details of the compact 
would become quasi-state law, requiring state law enforcement officials to 
abide by the terms in the compact.
176
 Because signing the compact effectuates 
it into state law, Oklahoma has little to lose with respect to federal 
prosecution, provided that the compact adequately protects against the threats 
headed in the Cole and Wilkinson memos.
177
 In reality, Oklahoma would 
have everything to gain, at least in this short window of opportunity. The 
state could theoretically position a compact to outlive the illegality of 
cannabis and reap the financial benefits all the while. This type of deal also 
provides insulation and protection to tribes from state intrusion, so long as 
they honor the terms set forth by the state in the compact.
178
 Again, the 
federal government still reserves the right to intervene if the state does not 
adequately protect against the Cole Memo threats.
179
 It is important to note, 
though, that the presence of a state compact with sufficient protections 
against these threats has so far resulted in the federal government leaving 
alone tribes and states with progressive cannabis regulations.
180
 
Because of the complex jurisdictional and sovereignty issues discussed in 
earlier portions of this Comment, it follows that Oklahoma tribes must fully 
cooperate with state government officials and prosecutors to avoid federal 
intrusion and ensure success of cannabis compacts. One example of a tribe 
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that cooperated with state officials but fell short of actually entering into a 
binding state compact is the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe of South Dakota. 
The Tribe had an ambitious goal to open the world’s first marijuana resort in 
South Dakota.
181
 The Tribe planned to permit sales and consumption of 
marijuana to persons over twenty-one years of age within tribal lands in 
accordance with a tribal vote held to legalize both medical and recreational 
use.
182
 The Tribe stated that its intention was to open a cannabis resort where 
buyers could purchase and consume cannabis on tribal property but would 
not be allowed to take any cannabis off-reservation in accordance with the 
third threat of the DOJ memos. Though the tribe was not officially raided, it 
unilaterally chose to burn its entire crop in November of 2015 after 




The Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin serve as another example of a failed 
attempt at approving and commoditizing tribal cannabis. The Menominee 
Tribe’s government voted with a 77% approval rate to allow the cultivation 
of medical marijuana and 58% approval for recreational marijuana.
184
 The 
Tribe then began growing industrial hemp as a research project and was 
subsequently raided by the DEA in October of 2015, resulting in the seizure 
of over 30,000 plants by federal authorities.
185
  
However, there is still hope for successful tribal-state compacts in 
Oklahoma if tribal governments create and enforce sufficiently strict 
regulations that satisfy the requirements of the DOJ memos. The most 
important assurance Oklahoma tribes would need to make would be that 
marijuana, even if legal on the reservation, could only be consumed on tribal 
lands and could not be transported to any other areas of the state. The “off-
reservation” flowing of cannabis into states where it is still illegal will 
assuredly trigger federal intrusion.  
Both the Flandreau Santee Sioux and Menominee made fatal mistakes that 
Oklahoma tribes should avoid at all cost. Neither of these tribes entered into 
state compacts, and they relied solely on tribal sovereignty as support for the 
legalization of cannabis on their lands, despite residing in states where 
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 It would be a fatal mistake for Oklahoma tribes 
to not enter into state compacts to work out the jurisdictional and regulatory 
complexities involved in a cannabis operation. Tribal lands are very 
fractionalized, so even if tribes legalize marijuana on tribal lands specifically, 
it would be nearly impossible for residents of the state to buy or consume 
cannabis on tribal lands and return home without crossing over state land. 
Additionally, because driving while under the influence is also a major threat 
listed in the DOJ memos, Oklahoma tribes would need to work with state 
officials in order to remain in compliance with the DOJ’s standards and 
prevent inevitable federal intrusion for noncompliance. Oklahoma, if 
successful, would be the first state to enter into marijuana compacts with 
tribes while the substance remains illegal in all areas of the state.  
Additionally, in Oklahoma, both the tribes and the state government are in 
a unique and advantageous position to achieve success in state-tribal cannabis 
compact negotiations. Tribes in Oklahoma should keep in mind that their 
main goal for self-regulation is to ensure that if they sell to members of the 
public, they do not allow them to consume off tribal lands. This allowance 
would directly conflict with the main threat mentioned in the Cole and 
Wilkinson memos, which essentially prohibits the traveling of marijuana 
from areas where it is legal (tribal lands) to areas where it is not. Tribes have 
a unique advantage with their sovereign status in the non-PL 280 state of 
Oklahoma, which has yet to enact its own robust regulation for the 
legalization of marijuana. In Oklahoma, the state could capitalize and 
immensely benefit from entering into a state compact with tribes before 
cannabis is officially legalized in the state. Entering into state cannabis 
compacts with Oklahoma tribes could benefit the State of Oklahoma in the 
same way that gaming did, by providing a lucrative source of revenue 
directed to a specific use, such as education. 
As long as the state and tribes work together to come to a formal 
agreement, state officials could ensure that the federal initiatives are satisfied 
while also making a revenue percentage part of the compact. It is important 
that tribes act before marijuana is actually legalized in the state in order to 
capitalize on the tribes’ unique exemption status. The downside of potentially 
paying some sort of percentage to the state, even though tribes are tax 
exempt, would be the price tribes are willing to pay to monopolize the 
Oklahoma cannabis industry. 
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In conclusion, the DOJ’s memos urge tribal governments to work hand-in-
hand with their respective state governments in order to enact cannabis 
regulations that comply with the Cole and Wilkinson memos and avoid the 
need for federal intrusion. While federal, state, and tribal governments all 
reserve their own respective rights and immunities, each are trying to work 
together in a cohesive manner to establish safe cannabis operations 
throughout the United States. The main question examined in this Comment 
was whether tribes in Oklahoma, where cannabis is still illegal, could use a 
state compact modeled after gaming compacts to cultivate cannabis on tribal 
lands. This cultivation would present a unique solution to both issues of tribal 
poverty and the immense underfunding to Oklahoma’s public education 
system. As a solution to this crisis, Oklahoma could benefit from receiving a 
percentage of the revenues from tribal cannabis. The State and tribes must 
realize this benefit while they still can through the incorporation of an 
exclusivity fee into cannabis compacts modeled after Oklahoma’s gaming 
compacts. There is currently a $40 million gap in funding for Oklahoma 
public education, which only seems to grow each fiscal year, despite tribal 
gaming contributions to the state. Because exclusivity fees from gaming are 
decreasing, and therefore becoming unreliable for budgeting purposes, a 
cannabis exclusivity fee could be just the ticket to bridge the funding gap. 
Eventually, when states like Oklahoma legalize cannabis, the state will not be 
able to use “exclusivity” or a monopoly on the market as a bargaining chip, 
given tribes are exempt from federal taxes and from state taxes on revenues 
made on tribal lands.  
State-tribal cannabis compacts could make a huge difference in the quality 
of public education in Oklahoma, should the state government choose to 
allocate the funds where they are most needed. The biggest obstacle currently 
standing in the way of tribal cannabis is the reluctance of state actors to move 
towards any legalization of marijuana in the state. However, state actors 
could be motivated by the lessons they learned in their dealings with the 
legalization of tribal gaming in the state. By utilizing the undeniable revenue 
stream tribal cannabis could provide for Oklahoma public education, it is 
possible for state actors, who would otherwise oppose such an action, to 
support the legalization of marijuana on tribal lands because it would ensure a 
brighter future for education in the state.  
Even though many obstacles stand between tribes and the legalization of 
tribal cannabis in Oklahoma, none are insurmountable. Tribal cannabis is an 
intermediate solution that is available to Oklahoma, should it decide that the 
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need for adequately-funded public education outweighs the state’s current 
ban on cannabis. It remains to be seen whether Oklahoma will consider this 
unique solution to its most evident problem, the underfunding of public 
education in the state.  
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